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THE EFFECT OF A DEFENDANT'S AFFIRMATIVE
CONCEALMENT OF HIS SECURITIES FRAUD ON
SECTION 10(b) LIMITATIONS PERIODS
Civil statutes of limitations prescribe definite time periods within which
parties must present their claims in court to preserve their legal right to enforce those claims.' Statutes of limitations promote several policies.' Specifically, statutes of limitations protect the judicial system from the burden of stale
actions, 3 stimulate potential plaintiffs to litigate viable claims, 4 and provide
fairness for potential defendants.5 Due to the importance of the policy considerations underlying statutes of limitations, federal courts will imply limitations periods to causes of action that do not have an expressly applicable statute
of limitations provision.6 A claim under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19347 ('34 Act) is an example of a cause of action that lacks an express
statute of limitations.
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act and Securities and Exchange Commission
rule lOb-5 8 prohibit fraudulent or deceptive behavior in conjunction with the
1. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (statutes of limitations represent
determination of legislature that specified causes of action become unenforceable after lapse of
specified time).
2. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (statutes of limitations exist in all
prudent judicial systems and are vital to society's welfare). See generally, Marcus, Toward a
More DisparateStandard?, 71 GEo. L. J. 829, 836-38 (1983) (discussion of policies underlying
statutes of limitations in relation to fraudulent concealment doctrine); Special Project, Time Bars
in Specialized FederalCommon Law: FederalRights of Action andState Statutesof Limitations,
65 CoRNELL L. REv. 1011, 1014-20 (1980) (discussion of nature and purposes of statutes of limitations) [hereinafter cited as Time Bars].
3. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (statutes of limitations
relieve courts of burden of trying stale claims); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross,
651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.) (statutes of limitations prevent untimely suits that involve stale
evidence and absent witnesses from hampering adjudication process), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895
(1981).
4. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (statutes of limitations stimulate litigation and punish delay); N.L.R.B. v. California School of Professional Psychology, 583 F.2d
1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 1978) (statutes of limitations are designed to encourage parties to file suit
promptly); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 732 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (statutes of limitations require plaintiffs to protect their own interests), aff'd., 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
5. See Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (statutes of limitations
are designed primarily to assure fairness to defendants); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber
& Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.) (statutes of limitations relieve defendants of burden of
prolonged litigation and uncertainty of contingent liabilities), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
6. See Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961) (federal
courts will borrow limitations period from forum state in federal actions lacking specified limitations provision because Congress could not have intended unlimited period for enforcement of
federal right and judges lack authority to create limitations periods).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1983). Pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ('34 Act), the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgated its own fundamen-
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sale of any security.' Neither section 10(b) nor rule 10b-5, however, expressly
afford a private right of action for violation of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.'
Accordingly, federal courts have recognized an implied private right of action
under section 10(b) of the '34 Act." One result of Congress' failure to provide an express private right of action under section 10(b) is that federal courts
have had to look outside of the '34 Act to ascertain the applicable time period
within which the court will permit a plaintiff to bring an action under section
10(b).12
tal antifraud provision in SEC rule 10b-5. See id. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LoWENmrLs,
SEcUrrms -RAiu & CommoDrrms FRArD, § 2.2 (300)-(463), pp. 2:18-2:44.1 (1982) (discussion
of history of § 10(b) and resultant rule lOb-5) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERG & LOwENrm].
9. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-51 (1972) (protection
of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 extends to sellers of stocks to remedy purchasers' misrepresentations
concerning selling price of stock); Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 (1971) (protections of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 extend to creditors of defrauded
seller of securities). See generally 1 BROMBERG & LownEwms, supra note 8, at § 1.1, pp. 1:3-1:6
(discussion of purposes of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5); A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, §
1, at 1-3 to 1-5 (Securities Law Series vol. 5, rev. ed. 1980) (same)
10. See 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 8, at § 2.4 (110), p. 2:59 (express private
right of action exists under other fraud provisions of securities acts but not under § 10(b)); cf.
Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (holder of security has express private right
of action when material omissions or misrepresentations exist in security registration statement);
Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982) (purchaser of security has express private
right of action against seller who makes material omissions or misrepresentations in sale of security);
Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982) (persons with authority to control party
who incurs express liability under §§ 11 and 12 of Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) are jointly
and severally liable with controlled party unless controlling person had no knowledge of or
reasonable ground be believe in existence of controlled party's securities violation); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1982) (purchasers or sellers of security have
express private right of action against persons who willfully participate in manipulation of securities
prices); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1982) (issuer of securities
has express private right of action to recover any profits realized by director, officer, or principal
stockholder in first six months of director, officer, or principal stockholder's ownership of securities
for purpose of preventing unfair use of inside information); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
§ 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982) (purchasers or sellers of security who have relied upon materially false statements in SEC filings have express private right of action against perpetrators of
false statements).
11. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687 & n.10 (1983) (defrauded
purchaser of stock has implied private right of action under § 10(b) despite availability of express
remedy under § 11 of '33 Act); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975) (actual sellers or purchasers of securities have implied private right of action under § 10(b));
Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9 (1971)
(creditors of defrauded corporate seller of securities have implied private right of action under
§ 10(b)). In addition to the federal judiciary's recognition of an implied private right of action
under § 10(b) of the '34 Act, federal courts also have recognized implied private rights of action
under other provisions of the federal securities laws. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 430-31 (1964) (stockholders have implied private right of action under § 14(a) of the
'34 Act for mergers obtained through false and misleading proxy solicitations); Kirshner v. United
States, 603 F.2d 234, 241 (2d Cir. 1978) (beneficiaries of municipal pension fund have implied
private right of action under § 17(a) of '33 Act for securities fraud), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979).
12. See Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605, 611 (1980) (Weis, J.,
dissenting) (judiciary must borrow appropriate limitations period because no express time limita-
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To determine the applicable time period within which a court will hear
a section 10(b) action, federal courts will refer to the several statutes of limitations of the state in which the plaintiff filed his section 10(b) action.' 3 In particular, federal courts will adopt the forum state's limitations period which4
best effectuates the policies that Congress pronounced in section 10(b).1
tion exists for § 10(b) actions). In contrast to the lack of a limitations provision expressly applicable
to § 10(b) actions, the federal securities acts provide express limitations periods for the express

private rights of action contained in the securities acts. See A.

JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE

RULE IOB-5, § 235.02, at 10-7 n.3 (Securities Law Series vol. 5C, 2d rev. ed. 1983) (discussion of express limitations provisions contained in securities acts) [hereinafter cited as JACOBS];
see also supra note 10 (list of express private rights of action contained in securities acts). Not
only does the '34 Act contain no statute of limitations provision expressly applicable to § 10(b)
actions, but no general federal statute of limitations exists for federal civil actions such as those
under § 10(b). See Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Consequently, federal courts in § 10(b) actions have
borrowed limitations periods from the state in which the federal court is located. See infra note
13 (discussion of federal judiciary's practice of borrowing limitations period from forum state
in § 10(b) actions).
The limitation periods that federal courts have applied to § 10(b) actions establish specified
lengths of time during which a party's cause of action will remain viable. See Time Bars, supra
note 2, at 1012-13. The specified limitations period for § 10(b) actions normally will begin running at the time of the defendant's original violation of § 10(b). See Campbell v. Upjohn Co.,
676 F.2d 1122, 1126 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's § 10(b) right of action accrued at time of defendant's last overt act causing injury to plaintiff); cf. Equilease Corp. v. State Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 647 F.2d 1069, 1073 (10th Cir. 1981) (cause of action accrues for limitations purposes
when party possessing cause of action has legal right to sue). Under the "discovery rule," however,
federal courts often will postpone the starting point of a § 10(b) limitations period until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the defendant's
§ 10(b) violation. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th
Cir. 1984); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 682 (6th Cir. 1981); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422
F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
13. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1975) (federal courts should borrow
forum state's limitation law in § 10(b) actions); cf. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97,
104 (1971) (general rule is that federal courts should apply analogous state statute of limitations
to federal actions lacking particular statute of limitations). The rule that federal courts should
adopt a limitations period from the forum state in § 10(b) actions is consistent with the Rules
of Decision Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982) (federal courts must apply law of forum state
absent congressional acts or constitutional considerations). At least one law review article, however,
has suggested that the Rules of Decision Act does not compel federal courts to apply a forum
state's statute of limitations to federal causes of action that lack express limitations periods. See
Time Bar, supra note 2, at 1038-42. The article suggests that Congress left discretion with the
judiciary to determine the applicable limitations period when a federal cause of action lacks an
express statute of limitations provision. See id.; see also Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611
F.2d 450, 458 (3d Cir. 1979) (Sloviter, J., concurring) (primary reason that courts resort to state
statutes of limitations when federal cause of action lacks express limitations period is principle
of expedience).
14. See Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1978) (federal courts must apply
state statute of limitations that best effectuates policy of § 10(b)); Hudak v. Economic Research
Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996, 999 (5th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975).
To determine which of a forum state's several statutes of limitations best effectuates the policies
underlying § 10(b), federal courts ascertain the state cause of action that most closely resembles
a private cause of action under § 10(b). See Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625 F.2d 151, 153 (7th
UNDER
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Generally, federal courts will choose between the limitations period applicable
to a state action for common-law fraud and the limitations period found in
the antifraud provisions of the forum state's blue sky laws.' 5 The federal courts
in several circuits, however, disagree on whether to borrow a forum state's
blue sky limitations period or common-law fraud limitations period for section 10(b) actions.1 6 Additionally, the time period contained in each of one
forum state's applicable limitations provision, regardless of the classification
of that limitations provision as blue sky or common-law fraud, often will differ from the time period contained in another forum state's correspondingly
applicable limitations provision. 7 Consequently, considerable disparity exists
Cir. 1980) (federal courts should apply limitations period that is applicable to most closely analogous
cause of action under forum state's laws); Ferber v. Morgan Stanley Co., [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,634, at p. 97,504-05 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1984) (in § 10(b)
actions, federal courts must determine nearest appropriate limitations provision of forum state's
laws). Upon ascertaining the forum state's cause of action that most closely resembles a § 10(b)
action, the federal court will apply to the § 10(b) action the limitations period that is applicable
to the analogous state action. See Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 694 (Ist Cir. 1978).
15. See Block & Barton, Statutes of Limitations in PrivateActions UnderSection 10(b)-A
Proposalfor Achieving Uniformity, 7 SEc. REG. L. J. 374, 375 (1980). Although federal courts
most often choose between a forum state's common-law fraud limitations period and the forum
state's blue sky limitations period when determining the limitations period to apply to a § 10(b)
action, a federal court also may refer to the limitations period contained in the forum state's
catch-all statute of limitations for civil actions. See Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 501 F. Supp.
830, 837 (D. Hawaii 1980) (court applied Hawaii's general civil six-year statute of limitations
to § 10(b) action). See generally Block & Barton, supra, at 375 n.8 (list of state limitations statutes,
other than blue sky or common-law fraud limitations provisions, that federal court might apply
to section 10(b) action).
16. See Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1379-80 (D. Del. 1981) (court discussed differences
between federal circuits concerning selection of forum state's limitations periods in § 10(b) action).
Currently, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits normally apply a forum state's common-law fraud statute
of limitations in § 10(b) actions. See Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041
(10th Cir. 1980) (court applied forum state's common-law fraud statute of limitations to federal
§ 10(b) action); Rochelle v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 531 (9th Cir. 1976)
(same). In contrast, some circuits have decided that the federal district courts should apply a
forum state's blue sky statute of limitations to § 10(b) actions. See Cahill v. Ernst & Ernst, 625
F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1980) (court applied forum state's blue sky statute of limitations to federal
§ 10(b) action); Morris v. Stifel, Nicholas & Co., 600 F.2d 139, 146 (8th Cir. 1979) (same). Moreover,
some circuits decide which of a forum state's limitations periods a federal court should apply
in a § 10(b) action on a case-by-case basis. Compare Wood v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 643
F.2d 339, 342-46 (5th Cir. 1981) (court applied forum state's common-law fraud statute of limitations to federal § 10(b) action) with Hudak v. Economic Research Analysts, Inc., 499 F.2d 996,
1000 (5th Cir. 1974) (court applied forum state's blue sky statute of limitations to federal § 10(b)
action), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) and Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1125-26
(6th Cir. 1982) (court applied forum state's blue sky statute of limitations to federal § 10(b)
action) with IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Mich. Corp., 533 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir.
1976) (court applied forum state's common-law fraud statute of limitations to federal § 10(b) action).
17. Compare Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1983) (court adopted
New York's six-year common-law fraud statute of limitations in § 10(b) action) with Militsky
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 540 F. Supp. 783, 785 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (court adopted
Ohio's four-year common-law fraud statute of limitations in § 10(b) action) and Diamond v.
LaMotte, 709 F.2d 1419, 1422 (1lth Cir. 1983) (court adopted Georgia's two-year blue sky statute

1984]

SECTION 10(b) LIMITATIONS

1119

among the limitations periods that the federal courts apply to section 10(b)
actions.'I
The Third Circuit's decision in Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields,

Inc.'9 depicts the problems that can result from the uncertainty regarding a
federal court's choice between disparate state limitations periods in section
10(b) actions.2 0 In Biggans, the United States District Court for the Eastern

of limitations in § 10(b) action) with Pierson v. Dean, Witter, Reynolds, Inc., 551 F. Supp 497,
499 (C.D. I11.1982) (court adopted Illinois' three-year blue sky statute of limitations in § 10(b)
action). Generally, state blue sky limitations provisions provide shorter limitations periods than
state common-law fraud limitations provisions. Accordingly, whether a federal court borrows
a forum state's blue sky limitations period or common-law fraud limitations period primarily
depends upon whether the federal court believes that a longer or shorter limitations period best
effectuates the policies underlying § 10(b). See Block & Barton, supra note 15, at 377. Compare
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7, 569 F. Supp. 310, 32L (E.D. Mo.
1983) (court borrowed forum state's two-year blue sky limitations period and stated that Congress preferred short limitations periods for § 10(b) actions) and Bailey v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood,
Inc., 414 F. Supp. 475, 483 (D. Minn. 1976) (court borrowed forum state's three-year blue sky
limitations period and referred to federal policy favoring short limitations periods in § 10(b) actions)
with IDS Progressive Fund, Inc. v. First of Mich. Corp., 533 F.2d 340, 344 (6th Cir. 1976) (court
borrowed forum state's six-year common-law fraud limitations period and stated that longer §
10(b) limitations period better effectuates remedial policies of federal securities laws) and Campito
v. McManus, Longe, Brockwehl, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 986, 993 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (same).
18. See JACOBS, supra note 12, § 235.02, at 10-20 to 10-26 (fifty state survey of limitations
periods applicable to § 10(b) actions). The great disparity that exists in the length of the limitations periods that the federal courts have applied in § 10(b) actions has caused some commentators to urge the federal judiciary to adopt a uniform national limitations period for § 10(b)
actions. See Block & Barton, supra note 15, at 380-82 (federal courts should adopt uniform national
statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions based upon express limitations provisions in other securities
fraud provisions); Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 1972 DutCE
L. J. 1125, 1148-50 (1972) (same). One shortcoming that results from the disparity in § 10(b)
limitations law is that dilatory plaintiffs can search for a federal court sitting in a state with
the most liberal limitations period. See Block & Barton, supra note 15, at 378 (disparity in §
10(b) limitations law permits § 10(b) plaintiffs to engage in forum shopping for longer limitations
periods for themselves and as class representatives for others); Note, Laches in FederalSubstantive Law: Relation to Statutes of Limitations, 56 B.U.L. Rav. 970, 984 (1976) (federal court
reliance on state limitations law promotes forum shopping within the federal judicial system).
Moreover, the fact that the federal securities laws afford considerable leniency to plaintiffs in
their choice of venue for § 10(b) actions increases the potential for plaintiffs to sea4ch out favorable
federal forums. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1982) (plaintiff
may bring § 10(b) action in federal district court in any district where defendant is found or
is inhabitant or transacts business).
19. 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).
20. See Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605, 606-12 (3d Cir. 1980).
Another case that depicts the confusion that can result from nonuniformity in federal court
application of state limitations periods is Ferber v. Morgan Stanley Co., [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,634 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1984). In Ferber, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that both the three-year Pennsylvania
blue sky limitations period and the shorter Pennsylvania limitations period for common-law actions in contractual misrepresentation applied to different portions of the same § 10(b) action.
See id. at p. 97,505-06; see also In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. 96,015, p. 91,566-72 (D. Kan. March 18, 1977) (court held limitations periods
from several different states applicable to § 10(b) class action).
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District of Pennsylvania granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Pennsylvania's three-year blue sky limitations period
barred the plaintiff's section 10(b) action. 2 The district court judge believed
that Third Circuit precedent supported this holding. 22 On appeal, the Third
Circuit vacated the district court's decision to grant the defendant's motion

for summary judgment.23 The Third Circuit held that Pennsylvania's six-year
common-law fraud limitations period, and not Pennsylvania's three-year blue
sky limitations period, applied to the plaintiff's section 10(b) claim. 2 ' The
dissenting judge in Biggans criticized the majority for creating a case-by-case
test to determine the applicable limitations period in section 10(b) actions. 2s
The Biggans dissent believed that the Third Circuit should have established
a uniform rule requiring federal courts in the Third Circuit to apply a forum
state's blue sky limitations period to section 10(b) actions. 26 In support of
21. See 487 F. Supp. 829, 831 (E.D. Pa.), vacated, 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980). In Biggans
v. Bache Halsey StuartShields, Inc., a stockholder brought a § 10(b) action against the brokerage
house that had handled the plaintiff's stocks. Id. at 829-30. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's agent had practiced "churning," or excessive trading of the plaintiff 's account. Id.
22. See id. at 830; see also Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 456 (3d Cir.
1979) (court applied New Jersey's six-year common-law fraud limitation period to § 10(b) action).
The district court stated that the Third Circuit, in Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., established
a principle for federal courts in the Third Circuit to apply the limitations period contained in
the law of the forum state that covers a scope of activity analogous to the scope of § 10(b).
See 487 F. Supp. at 830. The district court distinguished the Roberts court's decision to apply
New Jersey's common-law fraud limitations period to a § 10(b) case by noting that Pennsylvania's
blue sky antifraud provision embraced a broader range of securities fraud than New Jersey's
corresponding blue sky antifraud provision embraced. See id.
23. 638 F.2d 605, 611 (3d Cir. 1980).
24. See id. at 610-11. In reversing the district court's application of Pennsylvania's blue
sky limitations period in the Biggans case, the Third Circuit clarified its § 10(b) choice-of-limitations
principle that was established in Roberts. See id. at 608-09; see also supra note 22 (discussion
of Roberts principle). In Biggans, the Third Circuit ruled that a federal court must apply the
limitations period from the forum state's law that would provide the plaintiff with a cause of
action identical to the plaintiff's § 10(b) cause of action. See 638 F.2d at 608, 610. The Biggans
court noted that Pennsylvania's blue sky antifraud provision did not provide the plaintiff with
a cause of action identical to the plaintiff's § 10(b) claim for damages. See id. at 609-10. The
Biggans court further noted that the plaintiff would have a claim for damages under Pennsylvania's
common law. See id. at 610. Consequently, the Biggans court held that the plaintiff's § 10(b)
claim was timely under Pennsylvania's six-year common-law fraud limitations period. See id. at 611.
25. See id. at 611-12 (Weis, J., dissenting).
26. See id. The dissenting judge in Biggans criticized the majority's approach of examining
a forum state's laws for an exact duplicate of a plaintiff's § 10(b) remedy to determine the applicable
limitations period for the plaintiffs § 10(b) action. See id. at 611. The dissenting judge believed
that the majority's approach promoted disparity by having the determination of the applicable
§ 10(b) limitations period depend upon the form in which the plaintiff alleged his § 10(b) claim.
See id. at 612. The dissenting judge maintained that the Biggans court should have followed
the majority of federal circuits and applied the limitations period contained in the forum state's
law possessing a common purpose with § 10(b). See id. at 611. The dissent noted that this "commonality of purpose" approach stressed the similar policy considerations between § 10(b) and
the forum state's law. See id. The dissenting judge stated that under the commonality of purpose
approach, the federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania would apply Pennsylvania's blue sky limitations period to all § 10(b) actions. See id. at 611-12.
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his position, the dissenting judge noted that the preclusive effect that statutes
of limitations have on a case mandates that the public should be capable of
accurately predicting the limitations period that a court will apply to a par27
ticular cause of action.
Another case which illustrates the problems that can result from the lack
of uniformity existing in the choice of limitations periods for section 10(b)
actions is Campbell v. Upjohn Co. 28 In Campbell, a plaintiff brought a section 10(b) action in the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut. 29 On stipulation of both parties, the Connecticut federal district
court transferred the case to the United States District Court for the Western
District of Michigan.3" Applying Connecticut's two-year blue sky limitations
period, the Michigan federal district court barred the plaintiff's section 10(b)
action. 3 The Michigan federal district court noted, however, that the plaintiff could have availed himself of Michigan's six-year common-law fraud limitations period if the plaintiff had filed his section 10(b) action initially in
Michigan. 2 Clearly, the disparity existing among the limitations periods that
the federal courts apply to section 10(b) actions will promote the injustice
of encouraging section 10(b) plaintiffs to select their forums based on the ap3
plicable limitations law.
As both the Biggans and Campbell decisions demonstrate, a defendant's
successful invocation of a statute of limitations defense will bar a plaintiff's
cause of action absolutely. 34 Consequently, a number of federal courts have
27. 638 F.2d at 611 (Weis, J., dissenting); see Time Bars, supra note 2, at 1075-78 (policies
underlying statutes of limitations require that parties be able to predict applicable limitations
periods in potential causes of action).
28. 498 F. Supp. 722 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
29. See 498 F. Supp. 722, 724 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
In Campbell, the plaintiff originally brought his securities fraud action in a Connecticut state
court. See id. Due to the existence of a federal right of action under § 10(b), the defendant removed
the plaintiff's action to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. See id.;
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1982) (whenever United States district courts have original jurisdiction over cause of action that plaintiff files in state court, defendant may remove cause of action
to United States district court located in place where state action is pending).
30. See 498 F. Supp. at 724.
31. See id. at 732.
32. See id. at 726 n.4.
33. See supra note 18 (discussion of forum shopping resulting from disparity in § 10(b)
limitations law).
34. See Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879) (statutes of limitations conclusively
bar late claims). Since a defendant's successful invocation of a statute of limitations defense will
terminate a plaintiff's cause of action absolutely, federal courts have indicated that § 10(b) limitations
issues are appropriate for summary disposition. See Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
727 F.2d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1984) (defendant may raise statute of limitations defense on motion
for judgment notwithstanding verdict); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Public Water Supply Dist. No.
7, 569 F. Supp. 310, 313 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (motion for summary judgment is appropriate method
for raising statute of limitations defense); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 729 (W.D.
Mich. 1980) (defendant may raise statute of limitations defense on motion to dismiss for failure
to state claim), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (defendant
may request federal district court to dismiss plaintiff's cause of action prior to defendant's answer
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noted that the statute of limitations defense operates harshly against plaintiffs
whose claims would be valid but for the statute of limitations defense." Despite
the insensitivity of the statute of limitations defense toward the merits of a
plaintiff's cause of action, federal courts consistently will bar a plaintiff's claim
when the plaintiff unjustifiably commences his action past the specified limitations period. 6
To ameliorate the severity of the limitations statutes, the federal judiciary
has developed a tolling37 principle known as the equitable tolling doctrine.3
and on facts alleged in plaintiff's complaint alone); FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b) (judgment notwithstanding verdict operates to set aside jury verdict for winning party and enter judgment for party
who lost on jury verdict); FE. R. Civ. P. 56 (court may enter judgment prior to presentation
of evidence upon finding that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists). Some federal courts,
however, have urged caution in summarily resolving section 10(b) limitations issues because plaintiffs
often can raise factual issues at trial that thwart a defendant's statute of limitations defense.
See Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708, 711 (7th Cir. 1975) (court refused to grant defendants'
statute of limitations motion for summary judgment because equitable tolling issues required
resolution at trial and not by affidavit); Diener v. Beckley Coal Corp., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,663, p. 97,653 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1984) (federal courts should exercise care when evaluating defendant's statute of limitations motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim
because plaintiff may raise counteracting factual issues); see also infra note 44 (discussion of
fact finder's role in resolving equitable tolling issues).
35. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (statutes of limitations often
require courts to bar otherwise valid claims); Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,
314 (1945) (statutes of limitations arbitrarily preclude claims without regard to merits of claim
or unavoidability of plaintiff's delay); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 732 (W.D.
Mich. 1980) (statutes of limitations operate to preclude valid claims), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th
Cir. 1982); see also Marcus, supra note 2, at 873 (time periods specified in statutes of limitations
are arbitrary and often hinder policies underlying plaintiff's right of action).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 125 (1979) (courts should apply statutes
of limitations with strict compliance to intent of legislative provision); Militsky v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 540 F. Supp. 783, 787-88 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (same); Campbell v. Upjohn
Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 732 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (federal courts must abide by limitations provisions because statutes of limitations represent sound policy), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).

37. See BLACK'S

LAW DICTIONARY

1334 (5th ed. 1979) (tolling of limitations statute means

suspension or temporary stoppage of running of limitations period). In contrast to accrual, which
occurs when a plaintiff acquires a legal right to sue, a tolling doctrine presupposes the existence
of a plaintiff's right to sue but postpones the actual running of the statutory limitations period.
See Marcus, supra note 2, at 846 n.121 (discussion of distinction between accrual and tolling);
see also supra note 12 (discussion of discovery rule of accrual). As a practical matter, the effects
of accrual and tolling on a § 10(b) action are identical. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 846 n.121
(distinction between accrual and tolling is tenuous); see also Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685,
695 (1st Cir. 1978) (tolling doctrine of fraudulent concealment is common-law counterpart of
accrual discovery rule contained in express limitations provisions of securities laws); JAcoBs, supra
note 12, § 235.03, at 10-32 (federal equitable tolling doctrine controls issue of § 10(b) accrual
discovery rule).
38. See Marcus, supra note 2 at 912 (equitable tolling doctrine mollifies statute of limitations defense); see also infra note 40 (discussion of purpose underlying equitable tolling doctrine). The United States Supreme Court first recognized the equitable tolling doctrine in Bailey
v. Glover. See 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1874) (Court refused to apply limitations provision
contained in bankruptcy act to bar plaintiff's action to set aside certain alleged fraudulent conveyances because defendant fraudulently concealed plaintiff's cause of action). In 1946, the Supreme
Court extended the equitable tolling doctrine to include actions based on federal statutes that
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The federal equitable tolling doctrine suspends the running of a limitations
period whenever a reasonably diligent plaintiff fails to discover his right of

action against a defendant due to the defendant's affirmative concealment
of his wrongdoing from the plaintiff or due to the inherent undiscoverability

of the defendant's original wrongful act. 39 The underlying purpose of the
lack specific limitations periods. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395-97 (1946) (Court
permitted plaintiff to bring federal cause of action beyond express limitations period contained
in borrowed state statute of limitations due to defendant's fraudulent concealment of plaintiff's
cause of action). Currently, federal courts unanimously recognize that the equitable tolling doctrine can suspend a borrowed state statute of limitations in § 10(b) actions. See, e.g., Newman
v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1975) (equitable tolling doctrine suspended borrowed state
limitations period in § 10(b) action); Hilton v. Mumaw, 522 F.2d 588, 602 n.13 (9th Cir. 1975)
(same); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
852 (1970). See generally Dawson, FraudulentConcealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MicH.
L. REv. 875 (1933) (seminal article on equitable tolling doctrine premised on defendant's affirmative concealment of plaintiff's right of action) [hereinafter cited as FraudulentConcealment];
Dawson, UndiscoveredFraudand Statutes of Limitation, 31 MicH. L. Rnv. 591 (1933) (seminal
article on equitable tolling doctrine premised on inherent undiscoverability of defendant's original
wrongdoing) [hereinafter cited as Undiscovered Fraud].
39. See Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 375 (7th Cir.) (federal equitable
tolling doctrine suspends statute of limitations when defendant conceals plaintiff's right of action
or when defendant's wrongdoing inherently conceals itself), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
The distinction between the equitable tolling doctrine arising from a defendant's affirmative acts
of concealment and the equitable tolling doctrine arising from a defendant's wrongdoing that
is inherently undiscoverable admittedly is obscure. See FraudulentConcealment, supra note 38,
at 877-78 (discussion of similarity of purposes and duplication of functions between affirmative
concealment and undiscovered fraud branches of equitable tolling doctrine). A simple formula
for measuring whether an equitable tolling case involves a defendant's affirmative concealment
or involves the undiscoverability of a defendant's original wrongdoing does not exist. See id.
881-82 (courts have defined the difference between affirmative concealment and undiscoverable
fraud only with overworked generalities). One general rule that the federal judiciary has developed
to clarify the distinction between affirmative concealment and undiscoverable fraud is that affirmative acts of concealment must postdate the defendant's original wrongdoing. See Dekro v.
Stern Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406, 414-15 (W.D. Mo. 1982); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498
F. Supp. 722, 731 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982). Absent a fiduciary
duty, a defendant's mere denial of his original wrongdoing may not constitute affirmative concealment. See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 728 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676
F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982). Additionally, affirmative concealment only may include those actions
that a defendant renders directly towards the plaintiff. See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber
& Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 409 (D. Colo. 1979) (defendant's destruction of memo did not constitute affirmative concealment because conduct was not act of misrepresentation directed personally towards plaintiff), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
Generally, however, federal courts have recognized affirmative concealment in cases involving
a defendant's act of tampering with business records pertaining to the defendant's § 10(b) securities
fraud. See Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant's alteration
of accounting work papers and destruction of documentary evidence constituted affirmative concealment); Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant's failure to keep business
records, refusal to show business charters to primary investor, and failure to answer inquiries
from investors constituted affirmative concealment). But cf. Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp.,
459 F. Supp. 108, 118-19 (D. Conn. 1978) (plaintiff's allegations concerning defendant's careless
record keeping did not establish affirmative concealment on part of defendant). Moreover, a
defendant's failure to disclose the existence of an SEC action against the defendant for securities
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equitable tolling doctrine is to prevent the injustice of barring a plaintiff's
right to sue when the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's
failure to bring his claim within the specified limitations period. 40 In contrast
to the federal judiciary's practice of referring to state law to determine the
fraud may constitute affirmative concealment. See Vogel v. Trahan, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,303, p. 97,081 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1980) (plaintiff's allegations
concerning defendant's failure to obey a district court's order requiring defendant to disclose
to plaintiff pendency of SEC securities fraud action against defendant sufficiently established
affirmative concealment on part of defendant). In addition, federal courts have recognized affirmative concealment in cases in which a plaintiff inquires about a defendant's potential fraud
and the defendant lulls the plaintiff into inactivity. See McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen &
Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 199,538, p. 97,124 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
11, 1983) (defendant's repeated attempts to persuade plaintiffs not to pursue § 10(b) claim by
lulling plaintiffs into false sense of security constituted affirmative concealment); Cunha v. Ward
Foods, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 830, 836-37 (D. Hawaii 1980) (same). Finally, a federal court may
recognize affirmative concealment in cases in which a defendant follows a pattern of conduct
designed to prevent a plaintiff from discovering the defendant's original wrongdoing. See Trecker
v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 1982) (defendants' alleged concealment of contract negotiations, creation of "smokescreen" around terms of contract, and continued misrepresentation
concerning terms of contract constituted affirmative concealment).
Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the federal judiciary's attempts to define
affirmative concealment, federal court attempts to interpret the parameters of the inherent undiscoverability branch of the equitable tolling doctrine are virtually nonexistent. See Undiscovered
Fraud,supra note 38, at 597-606 (discussion of early attempts of judiciary to establish limitations
tolling doctrine in cases premised on fraud); see also Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F.
Supp. 108, 120 (D. Conn. 1978) (court noted lack of case law explaining meaning of inherently
undiscoverable fraud). As a threshold matter, federal courts uniformly require § 10(b) plaintiffs
to allege more than merely the failure to discover the existence of the § 10(b) claim to invoke
the undiscoverable fraud branch of the federal equitable tolling doctrine. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1127 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff's ignorance of his § 10(b) cause
of action by itself will not suspend running of applicable limitations period); Hupp v. Gray,
500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974) (plaintiff may not rely on own unawareness of facts to invoke
equitable tolling doctrine); Dekro v. Stern Bros. & Co., 540 F. Supp. 406, 414 (W.D. Mo. 1982)
(same). To constitute inherently undiscoverable fraud under the equitable tolling doctrine, the
defendant's original wrongdoing must possess such a hidden nature that a plaintiff, even by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, would be incapable of discovering the wrongdoing. See Long
v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 120 (D. Conn. 1978); cf. Timmreck v. Munn,
433 F. Supp. 396, 404 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (fraudulent promises concerning future conduct constitute
inherently undiscoverable § 10(b) fraud under federal equitable tolling doctrine).
40. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 874-75 (underlying purpose of equitable tolling doctrine
is avoidance of unfair application of statute of limitations defense); Time Bars, supra note 2,
at 1085 (equitable tolling doctrine promotes fairness and credibility of judiciary by protecting
plaintiff's valid right of action from defendant's fraudulent conduct); see also Burnett v. New
York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (interests of justice will outweigh fairness-to-defendant
policy of statutes of limitations and will preserve plaintiff's right of action against defendant
when defendant has misled plaintiff); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] FED. Sac. L. REp. (CCH) 99,538, p. 97,124 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1983) (equitable tolling
doctrine prevents defendant from taking advantage of plaintiff's naivete or laxity).
The effect of the equitable tolling doctrine on a case is to extend the length of time during
which a plaintiff's right of action against a defendant will remain viable. See Trecker v. Scag,
697 F.2d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1982) (federal equitable tolling doctrine acts to extend applicable
limitations period in § 10(b) actions). In contrast to the capacity of the equitable tolling doctrine
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limitations period applicable to section 10(b) actions,"' federal common law
governs the circumstances that will suspend the running of borrowed state
limitations periods under the equitable tolling doctrine.42 Therefore, consisto suspend indefinitely the running of the borrowed limitations periods in § 10(b) actions, the
equitable tolling doctrine cannot extend the lifespan of a plaintiff's claim beyond the time periods
set out in the express limitations provisions of the federal securities acts. See Wack v. American
Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 792 (3d Cir. 1982) (equitable tolling doctrine does not apply
to express limitations provision contained in § 9(e) of '34 Act), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2118 (1983);
Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 562 F. Supp. 1324, 1344 (D. Del. 1983) (decided weight of authority
dictates that equitable tolling doctrine is inapplicable in cases involving express limitations provisions contained in § 13 of '33 Act); see also JAcoBs, supranote 12, § 235.02, at 10-7 n.3 (discussion of express limitations provisions contained in securities acts). But see Eaton v. Coal Par,
Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,675, p. 97,717-18 (S.D. Fla.
Feb. 9, 1984) (court applied equitable tolling doctrine to express limitations provision contained
in § 13 of '33 Act).
41. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text (discussion of federal court's reliance
on state limitations periods for § 10(b) actions).
42. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (federal courts should apply
federal equitable tolling doctrine to limitations periods borrowed from state law); Trecker v. Scag,
679 F.2d 703, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1982) (court applied federal principles of equitable tolling to borrowed
limitations period of forum state's blue sky laws in § 10(b) action); McConnell v. Frank Howard
Allen & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.(CCH) 99,538, p. 97,123 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 11, 1983) (court applied federal law on equitable tolling to borrowed limitations period
of forum state's common-law fraud statute of limitations in § 10(b) action).
Although federal courts uniformly apply federal principles of equitable tolling to the limitations periods that the federal courts have borrowed from the laws of the forum state, two recent
civil rights decisions of the United States Supreme Court arguably require federal courts not only
to adopt a forum state's limitations period when the federal cause of action lacks an express
limitations provision, but to adopt the forum state's tolling principles as well. See Board of Regents
v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-92 (1980) (plaintiff alleged that defendants violated due process
clause of fourteenth amendment by denying plaintiff's application for waiver of chiropractic licensing
examination without affording plaintiff evidentiary hearing or rendering statement of reasons
for denial); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457-67 (1975) (plaintiff
alleged that defendants violated § 706 of Title VII of Civil Rights Acts of 1964 by practicing
race discrimination with respect to seniority rules and job assignments). At least in civil rights
actions after Johnson and Tomanio, federal courts that have borrowed a forum state's limitations period also have borrowed the tolling principle of the forum state. See Keating v. Carey,
706 F.2d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1983) (court borrowed forum state's tolling rules as well as its limitations period in federal employment discrimination action); Moore v. El Paso County, Tex., 660
F.2d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 1981) (court applied state tolling rules to plaintiff's civil rights action),
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 51 (1982). In securities fraud cases, however, confusion exists concerning
whether a federal court may apply federal equitable tolling principles to § 10(b) actions or whether
the federal court must defer to state tolling principles. See, e.g., Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d
1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982) (court noted uncertainty concerning applicability of state or federal
tolling principles to § 10(b) actions); Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605,
607-08 n.3 (3d Cir. 1980) (court recognized possibility that federal courts should defer to state
tolling principles in § 10(b) cases). Compare Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 86-87 (2d Cir.
1983) (court applied forum state's tolling principles to § 10(b) action) with McConnell v. Frank
Howard Allen & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,538, p. 97,123
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1983) (federal law controls tolling principles in § 10(b) action despite existence
of conflicting tolling law from forum state). A recent law review article suggests that federal
courts should not follow the Tomanio rule for tolling limitations periods in federal implied private
actions. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 847-55.
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tent application of the federal equitable tolling doctrine to the borrowed limitations periods in section 10(b) actions serves to restore a modicum of uniformity
in the law governing limitations periods for section 10(b)
to the uncertainty
43
actions.
Although consistent application of the equitable tolling doctrine poten-

tially would provide some certainty to section 10(b) limitations law, federal
courts have invoked two seemingly inconsistent versions of the equitable tolling doctrine in section 10(b) actions. A majority of federal courts apply a
traditional version of the equitable tolling doctrine in which the limitations
period will remain suspended until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise
of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence of his right of
action." Under the traditional equitable tolling doctrine, a plaintiff who desires
43. See Time Bars, supra note 2, at 1030 (disparity among limitations periods that federal
courts have borrowed in several federal forums is insignificant problem as long as uniform
application of the various limitations periods enables claimants to predict lifespan of claims);
see also supranote 18 and accompanying text (discussion of disparity among limitations periods
that federal courts apply to § 10(b) actions). In their article, the authors of Time Bars argue
that predictability of the length of time that a cause of action will remain viable is the most
important factor for ensuring that statutes of limitations conform to their equitable purposes.
See id. at 1075-78, 1089.
44. See Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348-49 (1874) (seminal decision in which
Court recognized equitable measure of suspending statuses of limitations in cases in which plaintiff fails to timely discover fraud either because defendant concealed fraud or because defendant's fraud was undiscoverable); see also Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993,996 (7th Cir. 1974) (equitable
tolling doctrine will suspend running of § 10(b) limitations period in cases in which plaintiff fails
to timely discover defendant's securities fraud despite plaintiff's reasonable diligence in attempting to discover securities fraud); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 488 F.2d 912, 917-18 (4th
Cir. 1973) (federal courts will suspend running of § 10(b) limitations period until point when
plaintiff actually discovers, or in exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, existence
of defendant's securities fraud), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974).
Unless no material issue of fact exists, courts will leave to the trier of fact the issue of
whether a plaintiff should have discovered the existence of his right of action at a date beyond
the scope of the applicable limitations period. See Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 716 (11th
Cir. 1983) (district court correctly submitted question concerning plaintiff's diligent discovery
of his § 10(b) action to advisory jury); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1386-87 (D. Del. 1981)
(court denied defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim on limitations grounds because factual
issues concerning whether plaintiff should have discovered his § 10(b) action prior to extension
of scope of applicable limitations period were for jury). But see Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail,
Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 692-94 (10th Cir.) (court examined equitable origins of discovery
rule and determined that courts need not submit questions concerning plaintiff's reasonable diligence
in discovering his § 10(b) action to jury when court is able to decide matter on clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981). A number of factors can influence a fact finder's
determination regarding whether a plaintiff should have discovered the existence of his § 10(b)
right of action at a date beyond the scope of the applicable limitations period. See, e.g., deHaas
v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff's knowledge of related
legal proceedings can influence fact finder's determination of whether plaintiff diligently discovered
§ 10(b) rights of action); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1969) (extent to which
defendant's alleged violations of § 10(b) receive wide publication can influence fact finder's determination of whether plaintiff diligently discovered his § 10(b) right of action); Ohio v. Peterson,
Lowry, RaIl, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 408 (D. Colo. 1979) (amount in controversy
can influence fact finder's determination of whether plaintiff diligently discovered his § 10(b)
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the court to suspend the running of a section 10(b) borrowed limitations period
has the burden of establishing that he diligently safeguarded his rights.15 The
plaintiff must establish that any delay in the discovery of his section 10(b)
claim resulted from the inherent undiscoverability of the defendant's original
46
violation of section 10(b) or from the defendant's fraudulent concealment.

right of action), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981). Some controversy exists concerning whether a plaintiff's subjective characteristics, such as his lack of investment sophistication, should affect a fact finder's determination of the point in time when
the plaintiff should have discovered his § 10(b) claim. Compare Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 172 (10th Cir. 1974) (degree of sophistication of defrauded
investor is important factor in fact finder's determination regarding investor's diligent discovery
of his § 10(b) right of action) and JAcoEs, supra note 12, § 235.03, at 10-38 to 10-39 (better
reasoned cases charge plaintiff with discovery of § 10(b) right of action only if plaintiff, with
all his individual characteristics, should have known right of action) with Armstrong v. McAlpin,
699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983) (test concerning when plaintiff should have discovered § 10(b)
right of action is premised on standard of reasonably prudent plaintiff) and Marcus, supra note
2, at 875-76 (courts should measure plaintiff's reasonable diligence in discovering § 10(b) cause
of action in relation to person of ordinary intelligence).
45. See, e.g., Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 683-84 (6th Cir. 1981) (§ 10(b) plaintiff
must establish compliance with positive duty to exercise reasonable diligence to avail himself of
equitable tolling doctrine); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974) (same); Roberts
v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 945 (D.N.J. 1978) (same), rev'd on other grounds,
611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979).
46. See supra note 45. In Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., the Sixth Circuit
stated that a party must plead three elements to raise the fraudulent concealment branch of the
equitable tolling doctrine. 523 F.2d 389, 394 (6th Cir. 1975) (antitrust action). Specifically, the
Sixth Circuit required a plaintiff to establish that a defendant wrongfully concealed fraudulent
acts from the plaintiff, that the plaintiff failed to discover the wrongdoing of the defendant within
the applicable limitations period, and that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence in safeguarding his rights until the plaintiff's discovery of his right of action against the defendant.
Id.; cf. Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank, 509 F.2d 1287, 1297 (7th Cir. 1975) (plaintiff must demonstrate
that defendant concealed plaintiff's § 10(b) claim and that plaintiff's failure to timely discover
defendant's securities fraud was not fault of plaintiff for plaintiff to invoke equitable tolling
doctrine), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Osadchy v. Gans, 436 F. Supp. 677, 681 (D.N.J.
1977) (same).
Because the equitable tolling doctrine arises from fraudulent conduct on the part of a defendant, rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictates that a plaintiff specifically plead
the facts underlying the equitable tolling doctrine. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (plaintiffs must aver
with particularity circumstances constituting fraud, other than defendant's condition of mind).
Based on the particularity requirement of rule 9(b), some federal courts have rejected the equitable
tolling arguments of § 10(b) plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' complaints have failed to allege
the elements underlying the equitable tolling doctrine with sufficient particularity. See Armstrong
v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88-89 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs' allegations of defendants' fraudulent
concealment did not satisfy rule 9(b) particularity requirements); Hill v. Equitable Trust Co.,
562 F. Supp. 1324, 1344 (D. Del. 1983) (court required plaintiffs to amend their complaint to
include specific allegations to defendant's fraudulent concealment because plaintiff's conclusory
complaint failed to raise equitable tolling doctrine with sufficient particularity). A few courts,
however, have relaxed the plaintiff's burden to plead with particularity the circumstances underlying
the applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine. See Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 508 (7th
Cir. 1975) (§ 10(b) plaintiff need only aver facts sufficient to assure notice to defendants to raise
issue of equitable tolling doctrine); EngI v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (same).
Federal courts sometimes relax the particular pleading requirements of rule 9(b) in § 10(b) claims
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Accordingly, the majority of federal courts will consider a defendant's affirmative concealment of his alleged violation of section 10(b) only to the extent
that the affirmative concealment affects the point in time when a plaintiff,
in the exercise of his reasonable diligence, should have discovered the existence
47
of his section 10(b) right of action against the defendant.
In contrast, a minority of federal courts often excuse a plaintiff who invokes the equitable tolling doctrine from the burden of establishing his

reasonable diligence in safeguarding his section 10(b) rights.4 s These federal
courts draw a distinction between cases in which a defendant affirmatively
conceals his alleged section 10(b) violation from the plaintiff and cases in which
the defendant took no affirmative steps to conceal his original act but the
nature of the defendant's violation of his section 10(b) made the plaintiff's
right of action inherently undiscoverable.4 9 In those cases involving inherently
undiscoverable securities fraud in which a defendant made no affirmative attempt to conceal his alleged section 10(b) violation, the minority courts will
emulate the traditional equitable tolling doctrine and suspend the limitations
period only until the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence

should have discovered, his section 10(b) right of action." In cases involving
a defendant's affirmative concealment of his alleged securities fraud, however,
these federal minority courts will suspend the limitations period until the plaintiff actually discovers the existence of his section 10(b) right of action." This
because much of the information concerning a defendant's concealment of a § 10(b) violation
is often within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant. See Bastien v. R. Rowland & Co.,
[1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,114, p. 95,335-36 (E.D. Mo. Feb.
25, 1983).
47. See, e.g., Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1387 (D. Del. 1981) (plaintiff's allegations
concerning defendant's concealment of § 10(b) violations relate to plaintiff's reasonable diligence
in discovering right of action); Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 727-28 (W.D. Mich.
1980) (evidence of defendant's fraudulent concealment bears heavily on issue of plaintiff's reasonable
diligence in discovering defendant's fraud), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); cf. Osterneck
v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 79 F.R.D. 47, 52-53 (N.D. Ga. 1978) (fraudulent concealment is
not tolling device but instead is factor for determining whether plaintiff could have discovered
defendant's fraud); Maine v. Leonard, 365 F. Supp. 1277, 1283 (W.D. Va. 1973) (same).
48. See infra notes 53-55 (list of courts that have adopted modified equitable tolling doctrine).
49. See Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 1982) (court recognized distinction
between affirmative concealment branch and inherently undiscoverable fraud branch of federal
equitable tolling doctrine); McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REp. (CCH) 99,538, p. 97,123-24 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1983) (same); Fraudulent
Concealment, supra note 38, at 877-82 (discussion of distinction between equitable tolling premised
on undiscovered fraud and equitable tolling premised on affirmative concealment); Marcus, supra
note 2, at 856-57 n.185 (same); see also supra note 39 (same).
50. See, e.g., Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1975)
(court examined plaintiffs' exercise of reasonable diligence in determining whether to invoke
equitable tolling doctrine because plaintiffs' complaint failed to allege defendants' affirmative
concealment); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (absent defendant's affirmative concealment, equitable tolling doctrine suspends running of § 10(b) limitations period
only until reasonably diligent plaintiff could have discovered defendant's wrongdoing).
51. See, e.g., Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F. 2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1979) (defendant's active concealment of § 10(b) violation suspended running of applicable limitations period
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modified version of the equitable tolling doctrine excuses the plaintiff from
having to establish his reasonable diligence in safeguarding his section 10(b)
rights in cases involving the defendant's affirmative concealment. 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit created the
modified equitable tolling doctrine in three 1975 decisions." Since 1975, Seventh

until plaintiff actually discovered defendant's § 10(b) violation); McConnell v. Frank Howard
Allen & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RPp. (CCH) 199,538, p. 97,124 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 11, 1983) (same). The notion that a defendant's affirmative concealment of a plaintiff's
§ 10(b) claim will suspend the running of the applicable limitations period until the plaintiff actually discovers his § 10(b) claim derives from the common-law doctrine of equitable estoppel.
See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 728 n.6 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (courts that have
held that defendant's affirmative concealment indefinitely tolls § 10(b) limitations periods until
plaintiff's actual discovery of § 10(b) claim have determined that defendant's concealment operates
to estop defendant from asserting limitations defense), aff'd, 676-F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982); Vogel
v. Trahan [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,303, p. 97,080 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 11, 1980) (same); cf. Portmann v. United States, 674 F.2d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1982) (equitable
estoppel prevents litigant from maintaining certain position in court when prior fraudulent statement or action of that litigant reasonably'induced another party to rely detrimentally upon false
position). The distinction between the equitable tolling doctrine and equitable estoppel of a defendant's statute of limitations defense is that equitable tolling applies in § 10(b) cases in which
a federal court determines that the applicable limitations period has not and should not expire.
See Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 706-07 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussion of distinction between
equitable tolling doctrine and doctrine of equitable estoppel of defendant's statute of limitations
defense). In contrast, equitable estoppel of a defendant's statute of limitations defense in § 10(b)
cases applies only when the applicable limitations period already has expired. See id. See generally Dawson, Estoppel and Statutes of Limitations, 34 MIcH. L. Rev. 1, 23-24 (1935) (comparison
of doctrine of estoppel to equitable tolling doctrine) [hereinafter cited as Estoppel]. In Gieringer
v. Silverman, for example, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
held that the plaintiffs could not invoke the federal equitable toling doctrine to prevent Wisconsin's three-year blue sky limitations period from barring the plaintiffs' § 10(b) claim. See Gieringer v. Silverman, 539 F. Supp. 498, 502-03 (E.D. Wis. 1982). The Gieringer court held that
the plaintiffs' admission of their knowledge of the defendants' § 10(b) violation and the fact
that the defendants did not conceal affirmatively their wrongdoing rendered the federal equitable
tolling doctrine inapplicable. See id. at 503. The Gieringer court, however, indicated that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel could save the plaintiff's § 10(b) claim. See id. Nevertheless, the
Gieringercourt determined that the doctrine of equitable estoppel did not prevent the defendants
from barring the plaintiffs' § 10(b) claim under the statute of limitations defense. See id. The
court reasoned that the defendants had not sufficiently induced the plaintiffs to relinquish their
statute of limitations defense to permit the plaintiffs to avail themselves of the doctrine of equitable
estoppel. See id. As a practical matter, any distinction between the effects of the federal equitable
tolling doctrine and the doctrine of equitable estoppel of a defendant's statute of limitations
is insignificant. See Estoppel, supra, at 24 (any distinction between the actual effects of doctrine
of estoppel and equitable tolling doctrine on statute of limitations defense is artificial); Marcus,
supra note 2, at 863 n.225 (federal equitable tolling doctrine and doctrine of equitable estoppel
of defendant's statute of limitations defense are part of continuum of law excusing plaintiff's
failure to sue within limitations period).
52. See Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975) (court excused plaintiff from
duty to establish reasonable diligence in safeguarding his § 10(b) rights because defendants affirmatively concealed plaintiff's § 10(b) claim); cf. infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text (discussion
of limits on plaintiff's freedom from duty to establish reasonable diligence in cases involving
defendant's affirmative concealment under modified equitable tolling doctrine).
53. See Comment, The Seventh Circuit'sReformulation of the EquitableTolling Doctrine,
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Circuit courts consistently have permitted section 10(b) plaintiffs to avail
themselves of the modified equitable tolling doctrine.5 1 Moreover, several
federal courts in the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have adopted the
modified equitable tolling doctrine in section 10(b) actions. A majority of
federal courts,
however, have refused to adopt the modified equitable tolling
6

doctrine.

1982 ILL. L. Rav. 565, 569-71 (1982) (Seventh Circuit reformulated federal equitable tolling doctrine in three 1975 cases) [hereinafter cited as Seventh tircuit'sReformulation];see also Tomera
v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. Feb. 5, 1975); Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265
(7th Cir. Aug. 29, 1975); Sperry v. Barggren, 523 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. Sept. 2, 1975); infra notes
57-91 and accompanying text (discussion of Tomera, Goldstandt, and Sperry decisions).
54. See Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 1982) (court invoked modified equitable
tolling doctrine to prevent Wisconsin's three-year blue sky limitations period from barring plaintiff's § 10(b) action); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 404-05 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (court permitted plaintiffs to amend complaints to include allegations concerning defendants' affirmative
concealment so that plaintiffs could rely upon modified equitable tolling doctrine to save § 10(b)
claim from limitations preclusion); see also Board of Educ. v. Admiral Heating & Ventilation,
Inc., 94 F.R.D. 300, 301-02 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (court recognized applicability of modified equitable
tolling doctrine in antitrust cause of action); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105, 120 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (court recognized applicability of modified equitable tolling doctrine in commodities
cause of action); American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 431 F. Supp. 25, 28 (N.D.
Ill. 1976) (court invoked modified equitable tolling doctrine to save plaintiff's civil rights action
from limitations preclusion).
55. See Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593 (2d Cir. 1979) (court invoked
modified equitable tolling doctrine to save plaintiff's § 10(b) action from limitations preclusion);
McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,538, p. 97,123-24 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1983) (court invoked modified equitable tolling doctrine to prevent California's three-year common-law fraud limitations period from barring plaintiffs' § 10(b) action); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (court invoked
modified equitable tolling doctrine to prevent Pennsylvania's three-year blue sky limitations period
from barring plaintiffs § 10(b) action); Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 501 F. Supp. 830, 836-37
(D. Hawaii 1980) (court invoked modified equitable tolling doctrine to save plaintiff's § 10(b)
action from limitations preclusion); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 463 F. Supp. 934, 945 &
n.2 (D.N.J.) (dictum) (court recognized applicability of modified equitable tolling doctrine in
§'10(b) action), rev'd on other grounds, 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Rutledge v. Boston
Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1978) (Merrill, J., dissenting) (dissenting judge argued that modified equitable tolling doctrine saved plaintiff's antitrust action
from limitations preclusion); Township of Susquehanna v. H. & M. Inc., 98 F.R.D. 658, 668
(M.D. Pa. 1983) (court recognized applicability of modified equitable tolling doctrine in antitrust
action); Vogel v. Trahan, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rap. (CCH) 97,303, p.
97,080-81 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1980) (court invoked modified equitable tolling doctrine to save
plaintiff's claim under § 12(2) of '33 Act from limitations preclusion); Foodtown v. Sigma Mktg.
Sys., Inc. 518 F. Supp. 485, 492-94 (D.N.J. 1980) (court invoked modified equitable tolling doctrine to save plaintiff's breach of contract action from limitations preclusion); Husted v. Amrep
Corp., 429 F. Supp. 298, 306-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (court invoked modified equitable tolling doctrine to save plaintiff's claim under Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act from limitations
preclusion).
56. See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1982) (court expressly
rejected modified equitable tolling doctrine in § 10(b) action); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail,
Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); Brunner
v. Bush & Co., No. 75-88-C5, slip op. (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 1977) (same); In re Clinton Oil Co.
Sec. Litig., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 96,015, p. 91,572 (D. Kan.

19841

SECTION 10(b) LIMITATIONS

1131

The Seventh Circuit's decision in Tomera v. Galt" represents the origin
of the modified equitable tolling doctrine for section 10(b) actions. 8 In Tomera,
a plaintiff purchased stock in the defendants' foreign and domestic
corporations.5 9 When problems arose concerning the financial well-being of
the foreign corporations, the plaintiff and other investors sued the defendants
for alleged violations of section 10(b). 60 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the ground that Illinois' three-year blue sky limitations period
barred the plaintiff's section 10(b) action. 61 The district court ruled that the
plaintiff had failed to allege the existence of the defendants' fraudulent concealment of the plaintiff's section 10(b) action sufficiently to invoke the
62
equitable tolling doctrine.
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, the Tomera court reversed the district
court's decision and held that the equitable tolling doctrine saved the plaintiff's section 10(b) claim. 63 The Seventh Circuit stated that two types of
fraudulent behavior on the part of a defendant exist that will toll a limitations
period under the equitable tolling doctrine. 64 The first type involves fraud that
a plaintiff fails to discover even though the defendant does nothing to conceal
the existence of his securities fraud beyond the original fraudulent act. 65 The
Mar. 18, 1977) (same); see also In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1170 n.27
(5th Cir. 1979) (court expressly rejected modified equitable tolling doctrine in antitrust action);
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); Hauptmann v. Wilentz, 570 F. Supp. 351, 397-98 n.48 (D.N.J.
1983) (dictum) (court expressly rejected modified equitable tolling doctrine in civil rights action).
In addition to the federal courts that have expressly rejected the modified equitable tolling doctrine, the majority of federal courts implicitly have rejected the modified equitable tolling doctrine. See, e.g., Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7, 569 F. Supp. 310,
320-21 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (court required plaintiff to establish reasonable diligence under equitable
tolling doctrine despite plaintiff's allegation of defendants' affirmative concealment); Byrne v.
Gulfstream First Bank & Trust Co., 528 F. Supp. 692, 694-95 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (same), aff'd,
720 F.2d 686 (11th Cir. 1983); Hill v. Der, 521 F. Supp. 1370, 1387 (D. Del. 1981) (same).
57. 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
58. See Seventh Circuit'sReformulation, supra note 53, at 571-73 (Seventh Circuit fashioned
new law on federal equitable tolling doctrine in Tomera v. Gait).
59. 511 F.2d at 506-07.
60. Id. at 507.
61. Id. at 507-08. In addition to granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment
on statute of limitations grounds, the Tomera district court also granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment based on the plaintiff's failure to aver circumstances underlying his §
10(b) right of action with sufficient particularity under rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 507; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (plaintiffs must aver with particularity circumstances constituting fraud, other than defendant's condition of mind). On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court's determination that the plaintiff's pleadings were insufficient
under rule 9(b). 511 F.2d at 508-09. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that rule 9(b) requires a plaintiff to provide a defendant in a fraud case with only slightly more notice than the general pleading
standards under rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require. Id.; see FED. R. CIV.
P. 8 (general rules of pleading).
62. 511 F.2d at 509.
63. Id. at 509-11.
64. Id. at 510.
65. Id.
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Seventh Circuit stated that when a plaintiff alleges this first type of fraudulent
behavior, the plaintiff must establish his reasonable diligence in protecting
his rights from the defendant's fraud to suspend the applicable limitations
period under the equitable tolling doctrine."6 The second type of fraudulent
behavior occurs when the plaintiff fails to discover the defendant's fraud
because the defendant has taken positive steps to conceal the existence of the
fraud from the plaintiff.67 The Seventh Circuit held that when a plaintiff alleges
this second type of fraudulent behavior, the equitable tolling doctrine will suspend the applicable limitations period until the plaintiff actually discovers the
existence of the defendant's original fraud.6" In Tomera, the Seventh Circuit
held that the plaintiff's allegations that the defendants failed to keep investment records, refused to divulge corporation charters, leases, and agreements
to primary investors, and refused to answer inquiries concerning corporation
operations were sufficient to constitute affirmative concealment." The Tomera
court ruled that the plaintiff's complaint alleged facts which, if true, were
sufficient to suspend the applicable limitations period until the plaintiff actually discovered the existence of her right of action against the defendants. 70
The second Seventh Circuit decision to recognize the modified equitable
tolling doctrine in a section 10(b) action was Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns &
Co." In Goldstandt,two broker-dealers of securities brought a section 10(b)
action against a retail securities business in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois. 2 The broker-dealers' complaint alleged
that the defendants had misrepresented the legality of a security sales
procedure.73 Relying upon the defendants' representations, the plaintiffs suffered damages when the securities sales procedure turned out to be illegal.",
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Since the Tomera district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants
deprived the plaintiff of her opportunity to establish the defendants' affirmative concealment,
the Seventh Circuit remanded the action for the district court to render these factual determinations. Id.at 510-11.
71. 522 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975).
72. Id.at 1267.
73. Id. at 1266-67. In Goldstandt, the defendants allegedly informed the broker-dealer plaintiffs that a securities sales procedure was legal. Id. at 1266. The securities sales procedure involved "short sales" of unregistered securities that had registration statements pending with the
SEC. Id; see Provost v. United States, 269 U.S. 443, 450-51 (1926) (short sale is contract for
sale of shares of stock that seller does not own or control but which seller plans to acquire for
future delivery). Relying on the unprofessional legal advice of the defendants, the plaintiffs consummated thirty transactions involving the securities sales procedure suggested by the defendants.
522 F.2d at 1266.
74. 522 F.2d at 1266-67. As a result of the plaintiffs implementation of the securities sales
procedure that the defendants had suggested to the plaintiffs, the National Association of Securities
Dealers served the plaintiffs with a complaint alleging that the plaintiffs had violated certain
rules of fair practice in securities transactions. Id. After a hearing, the National Association of
Securities Dealers fined the plaintiffs $100,000 and permanently revoked the plaintiffs' membership in the Association. Id. at 1267.
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The district court held that the three-year limitation provision of Illinois' blue
sky laws barred the plaintiffs' section 10(b) action .7 5 The district court further
held that the plaintiffs could not invoke the federal equitable tolling doctrine
because the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege their diligence in attempting to discover the defendants' fraud. 76 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit endorsed the Tomera court's distinction between undiscovered fraud and affirmative concealment." The Goldstandt court stated that in cases in which a
defendant affirmatively conceals the existence of his fraud, the court should
suspend the running of the limitations period until the plaintiff actually
discovers the existence of the defendant's fraud.7 8 Since the broker-dealers'
complaint alleged no affirmative concealment on the part of the defendants,
however, the Goldstandt court resolved the equitable tolling issue by examining the plaintiffs' diligent efforts to protect themselves from the defendant's
securities fraud. 79 The Goldstandtcourt determined that the plaintiffs had failed
to exercise reasonable diligence.80 The Goldstandt court therefore affirmed
the district court's decision to preclude the plaintiffs' section 10(b) action. 8 '
In Sperry v. Barggren,8' the Seventh Circuit invoked the modified equitable
tolling doctrine once again. In Sperry, the plaintiff, an individual stockholder
in the defendants' company, sold his stock in the company to the defendants
for 200 dollars per share.8 3 Upon learning that the defendants subsequently
sold their company for 781 dollars per share of stock, the plaintiff brought
a section 10(b) action against the defendants for failing to disclose facts relevant to the value of the shares of stock."' The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 5 The district court held that Wisconsin's three-year blue sky
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1268; see supra text accompanying notes 64-68 (discussion of Tomera court's
recognition of distinction between equitable tolling premised on defendant's affirmative concealment and equitable tolling premised on inherent undiscoverability of defendant's wrongdoing).
78. 522 F.2d at 1268 (quoting Tomera v.Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975)).
79. Id.

80. Id.at 1269.
81. Id. In ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to exercise reasonable diligence in discovering
their § 10(b) claim that Goldstandt court characterized the plaintiffs as sophisticated investors.
Id.; see supra note 44 (discussion of conflict among federal courts over issue of whether fact
finder may consider plaintiff's subjective characteristics in determining when plaintiff should have
discovered § 10(b) claim).
82. 523 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 709. The plaintiff in Sperry, a retired foreman from the defendants' company,
owned 226 shares of the company's stock. Id. Following negotiations with the defendants, the
plaintiff agreed to sell 26 of his shares of stock to the defendants for $200 per share and also
agreed to give the defendants an option to buy the remaining 200 shares of stock for the same
price. Id. Subsequently, the defendants agreed to sell their company to a third party for $781
per share of the stock. Id. The defendants thereupon exercised their option and purchased in
a lump sum the plaintiff's remaining 200 shares of stock for $200 per share. Id.
84. Id. at 710.

85. Id.
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limitations period barred the plaintiff's section 10(b) cause of action."' The
district court further held that the existence of newspaper publicity of the defendants' subsequent sale of their company prevented the plaintiff from invoking
the federal equitable tolling doctrine to save his section 10(b) claim."7 The district
court believed that the existence of three newspaper accounts provided the plain-

tiff with sufficient notice of the defendant's activities to warrant a holding that
the plaintiff should have discovered his section 10(b) claim within the applicable
limitations period. 8

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
held that the modified equitable tolling doctrine suspended the running of
the three-year limitations period.8 9 The Sperry court stated that the issue of

whether the defendants had exercised affirmative concealment of the plaintiff's section 10(b) claim was an issue for the trier of fact. 90 The Sperry court
therefore remanded the action to the district court to determine whether the
defendants' affirmative concealment of the plaintiff's section 10(b) claim was
sufficient to suspend the running of the three-year limitations period until the
plaintiff actually discovered his section 10(b) claim. 9'
Unlike the Seventh Circuit's adoption of the modified equitable toling
doctrine in section 10(b) actions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit, in Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 92 refused to distinguish between
unconcealed but undiscoverable fraud and fraud that a defendant affirmatively
concealed. 93 In Campbell, a shareholder in a small corporation brought a section 10(b) action against the defendants, a larger successor corporation, for
fraudulently inducing the plaintiff to sign a merger agreement and for concealing the terms of the merger agreement from the plaintiff. 9 Under the merger
86. Id.
87. Id.at 711.
88. Id. In Sperry, the defendants' subsequent sale of their company to a third party received national and local newspaper publicity. Id. at 710. The national publicity consisted of
a four-line account in a national financial publication. Id. The local publicity consisted of small
articles in two Wisconsin newspapers. Id. In discussing the likelihood that the newspaper publicity would have notified the original plaintiffs of the defendants' securities fraud, the Seventh
Circuit noted that none of the news accounts mentioned the price that the third party paid the
defendants for each share of stock. Id. The Seventh Circuit also noted that the local Wisconsin
publicity was unlikely to provide the original plaintiff with notice of the defendants' securities
fraud because the original plaintiff was a resident of Florida. Id. at 711.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. The Sperry court did not specify what particular conduct of the defendants constituted potential affirmative concealment. Instead, the Sperry court only stated that the difficulty
that the plaintiffs' attorney encountered in obtaining information pertaining to the defendants'
alleged § 10(b) fraud indicated a possibility of the existence of affirmative concealment. Id. Consequently, the Sperry court remanded the plaintiffs' 10(b) action to the district court to determine
whether the defendants affirmatively concealed their securities fraud and, if not, whether the
plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered sooner the existence of
his § 10(b) claim. Id.
92. 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
93. Id. at 1128.
94. 498 F. Supp. 722, 724-25 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 676 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
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agreement, the plaintiff relinquished his interest in the small corporation to

the defendant.9" The United States District Court for the Western District of

Michigan held that the applicable two-year limitations period barred the plaintiff's section 10(b) cause of action. 96 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision to preclude the plaintiff's section 10(b) claim.97

The Campbell court expressly rejected the Tomera court's holding that a defendant's affirmative concealment suspends the running of a section 10(b) limitations period until the plaintiff actually discovers his section 10(b) claim. 9 Instead, the Campbell court held that a plaintiff must establish his reasonable

diligence in protecting his claim from the defendant's fraud to suspend a section 10(b) limitations period under the equitable tolling doctrine. 99
Some courts have indicated that any actual differences between the traditional equitable tolling doctrine and the modified equitable tolling doctrine
may be illusory.100 As a practical matter, the most significant difference between the conflicting doctrines involves the issue of whether a court should
require a plaintiff to establish his reasonable diligence in alertly protecting
In Campbell v. Upjohn Co., the plaintiff alleged that the defendant induced the plaintiff to merge
the plaintiff's interests in a small corporation with the defendant. Id. at 724. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant orally promised the plaintiff an employment contract and future bonuses in
the preliminary negotiations to the merger agreement. Id. at 724-25. When the parties finalized
the merger agreement, however, the defendant allegedly intimidated the plaintiff into signing
a merger agreement that did not contain an employment contract or future bonuses. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 730-32; see supra text accompanying notes 28-33 (discussion of Campbell court's
choice of limitations period).
97. 676 F.2d at 1128.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1982); Ohio v. Peterson,
Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 695 n.16 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
In Ohio v. Peterson,Lowry, Rail, Barber& Ross, the Tenth Circuit expressly rejected the Seventh
Circuit's distinction between equitable tolling premised on a defendant's affirmative concealment
and equitable tolling premised on the inherent undiscoverability of a defendant's wrongdoing.
See 651 F.2d at 694-95; see also supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text (discussion of Seventh
Circuit's formulation of modified equitable tolling doctrine in Tomera v. Gait). The Peterson
court ruled that a defendant's affirmative acts of concealment only influence the determination
of whether the plaintiff, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered his §
10(b) claim. See 651 F.2d at 694-95. The Peterson court stated that the distinction of the modified
equitable tolling doctrine between two tolling situations derives from a misconception that the
traditional equitable tolling doctrine requires a plaintiff to establish reasonable diligence. Id. at
695 n.16. The Peterson court, however, failed to support the belief that the traditional equitable
tolling doctrine permits plaintiffs to suspend the running of a § 10(b) limitations period without
requiring the plaintiff to establish reasonable diligence. See id. Moreover, the Peterson court's
statement seemingly contradicts the established case law underlying the traditional equitable tolling doctrine. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussion of requirement of traditional
equitable tolling doctrine that plaintiff establish reasonable diligence in safeguarding his rights
from defendant's fraud). In Campbell v. Upjohn Co., the Sixth Circuit quoted the Peterson court's
statement that the modified equitable tolling doctrine arises from a misconception that the traditional doctrine requires plaintiffs to establish reasonable diligence. 676 F.2d at 1128. The Campbell court, nevertheless, contradicted itself by requiring the plaintiff to establish reasonable diligence
when invoking the traditional equitable tolling doctrine. See id. at 1126-27.
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his rights from a defendant's fraud despite the defendant's affirmative actions
to prevent the plaintiff from discovering the securities fraud. 01 Theoretically,
the most significant difference between the two conflicting doctrines involves
the differing emphasis that each doctrine places upon the policies underlying
the statute of limitations defense. For instance, federal courts that have followed
the traditional equitable tolling doctrine require a plaintiff to exercise reasonable
diligence at all times have stressed the standard policies underlying statutes
0 3°
of limitations'02 such as a potential defendant's right to eventual ease of mind,
04
the protection of both defendants and courts from stale evidence,
and the
punishment of idle plaintiffs.' 5 Federal courts that have followed the modified
equitable tolling doctrine and excused a plaintiff's obligation to exercise
reasonable diligence in cases involving a defendant's affirmative concealment,
however, have stressed the turpitude of the defendant's conduct' 06 and the
injustice of barring a victimized plaintiff on the technicality of a statute of
limitations defense. 07 These practical and theoretical differences between the
traditional and modified equitable tolling doctrines reflect an underlying difference in focus between the two doctrines.' The traditional equitable tolling

doctrine always focuses upon the conduct of the plaintiff in exercising
101. Compare Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 695 (lst Cir. 1978) (court required plaintiff to establish reasonable diligence) with Robertson v. Seidman & Seidman, 609 F.2d 583, 593
(2d Cir. 1979) (defendant's affirmative concealment excused plaintiff of reasonable diligence
requirement).
102. See supra note 2 (authorities that have provided discussion of policies underlying statutes
of limitations).
103. See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir.) (statutes
of limitations relieve defendants of uncertainty of contingent liabilities), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
895 (1981).
104. See id. (statutes of limitations protect defendants and courts from vexatious litigation
based on stale evidence and absent witnesses).
105. See Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 498 F. Supp. 722, 732 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (statute of
limitations acted to bar plaintiff who negligently failed to protect his own interests). aff'd, 676
F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1982).
106. See McConnell v. Frank Howard Allen & Co., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99,538, p. 97,124 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 1983) (court justified excusing plaintiff's
obligation of reasonable diligence in case involving defendants' fraudulent concealment by noting
injustice of permitting defendants to intentionally take advantage of naivete or laxity of plaintiff); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (D. Colo. 1979)
(defendant's affirmative concealment will suspend running of applicable limitations period regardless
of plaintiff's exercise of reasonable diligence), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 895 (1981).
107. See Tomera v. Gait, 511 F.2d 504, 510-11 (7th Cir. 1975) (barring § 10(b) actions on
account of statute of limitations defense controverts basic policies of § 10(b); cf. Rochelle v.
Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 535 F.2d 523, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1976) (interests protected by
§ 10(b) outweigh interests protected by statutes of limitations).
108. See FraudulentConcealment, supra note 3, at 880 (defendant's affirmative acts of concealment in equitable tolling case will lead court beyond scrutiny of plaintiff's opportunities for
discovery to scrutiny of means by which defendant obstructed plaintiff's discovery); see also Long
v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 459 F. Supp. 108, 118 n.7 (D. Conn. 1978) (dictum) (trial judge
rendered informative footnote discussing policy arguments in favor of both modified and traditional versions of equitable tolling doctrine).
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reasonable diligence in bringing his section 10(b) claim.' °9 The modified
equitable tolling doctrine, however, shifts that focus to the conduct of the

defendant in cases in which the defendant affirmatively concealed the existence
of his section 10(b) securities fraud. " '
Several courts and two commentators have criticized the modified equitable

tolling doctrine for promoting confusion in the federal law of equitable tolling, creating indefinite liability for defendants, and providing a windfall for
inactive plaintiffs."' The critics describe the modified equitable tolling doctrine as a means for idle plaintiffs to escape limitations preclusion in cases
involving the defendant's affirmative concealment." 2 The critics of the modified
equitable tolling doctrine believe that the constant focus of the traditional
equitable tolling doctrine of the reasonable diligence of the plaintiff represents
a more equitable test for determining the length of suspension of a section
10(b) limitations period."'
Although language from Tomera v. Gait seemingly affirms the belief that
a plaintiff's mere allegation of a defendant's affirmative concealment
automatically and indefinitely will suspend a section 10(b) limitations period
under the modified equitable tolling doctrine, I'I post-Tomera cases that have
adopted the modified doctrine demonstrate that the modified doctrine is capable
of harmonizing the tensions between a plaintiff's exercise of diligence and
a defendant's affirmative concealment. 15 In Sperry v. Barggren, for example,
the Seventh Circuit determined that the existence of newspaper publicity surrounding the defendants' alleged section 10(b) violation did not prevent the

109. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Public Water Supply Dist. No. 7, 569 F. Supp. 310, 318
(E.D. Mo. 1983) (equitable tolling doctrine focuses on knowledge that plaintiff had or should
have had).
110. See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402, 406-07 (D. Colo.
1979) (equitable tolling doctrine shifts focus from plaintiffs exercise of reasonable diligence to
defendant's conduct in cases involving defendant's affirmative concealment), aff'd, 651 F.2d 687
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
I1l. See, e.g., Campbell v. Upjohn Co., 676 F.2d 1122, 1128 (6th Cir. 1982) (modified
equitable tolling doctrine fosters injustice by permitting indefinite suspension of § 10(b) limitations periods causing evidence to stale); Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d
687, 694 (10th Cir.) (modified equitable tolling doctrine promotes confusion by maintaining indefinite liability for defendants), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981); see also Marcus, supra note
2, at 878 (modified equitable tolling doctrine will add confusion to already confused area of
law by requiring courts to determine parameters of affirmative concealment); Seventh Circuit's
Reformulation, supra note 53, at 575-78 (modified equitable tolling doctrine creates indefinite
liability for defendants and provides windfalls for indolent plaintiffs).
112. See supra note 111 (criticism of modified equitable tolling doctrine).
113. See Seventh Circuit'sReformulation, supra note 53, at 577 (at some point court must
free defendant from liability).
114. See Tomera v. Galt, 511 F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975); see also supra notes 57-70 and
accompanying text (discussion of Tomera v. Gait). In Tomera, the Seventh Circuit stated that
whether the plaintiff personally inquired into the defendants' conduct was unimportant to the
classification of the defendants' conduct as affirmative concealment. 511 F.2d at 510.
115. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19 (discussion of Seventh Circuit's delimitation
of modified equitable tolling doctrine).
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plaintiff from invoking the modified equitable tolling doctrine.' "6 The Sperry
court noted that the sketchy nature and the limited circulation of the newspaper
accounts made the publicity insufficient to put the average shareholder in the
plaintiff's situation on notice of the defendants' section 10(b) violation." ,7 The
Sperry court's language raises the inference that more substantial publicity
would have provided the plaintiff with sufficient notice for the Seventh Circuit to have affirmed the district court's decision to time bar the plaintiff's
section 10(b) claim."I8 The Sperry decision therefore suggests that the modified
equitable tolling does not disregard entirely a plaintiff's exercise of reasonable
diligence in cases in which the plaintiff alleges affirmative concealment. Additionally, in Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co., the Seventh Circuit stated that
the modified equitable tolling doctrine provides an exception to a plaintiff's
duty to exercise reasonable diligence only in cases in which the plaintiff "could
not have known" of the defendant's securities fraud due to the defendant's
affirmative concealment." 9 As in Sperry, the Goldstandtdecision demonstrates
that the modified equitable tolling doctrine permits a court to properly balance
the separate effects of a plaintiff's exercise of diligence and a defendant's
affirmative concealment.
In contrast, the traditional equitable tolling doctrine requires a section
10(b) plaintiff to exercise reasonable diligence both in cases in which the plaintiff
delayed bringing suit merely because of the inherent undiscoverability of the
section 10(b) fraud and cases in which the defendant's affirmative concealment caused the plaintiff's delay.'20 The modified equitable tolling doctrine,
however, permits a federal court to consider the egregiousness of the defendant's affirmative concealment of his section 10(b) violation as an equitable
tolling factor that is independent of the plaintiff's exercise of reasonable
diligence.' 2' The modified equitable tolling doctrine, therefore, provides greater
flexibility and discretion to federal courts to determine whether the facts in

116. 523 F.2d 708,711 (7thCir. 1975); see supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text (discussion of Sperry v. Barggren).
117. 523 F.2d at 711; see supra note 88 (discussion of newspaper publicity in Sperry).
118. See Seventh Circuit'sReformulation, supranote 53, at 576 n.87 (implication arises from
language in Sperry that greater newspaper publicity of defendants' conduct would have required
plaintiff to timely discover § 10(b) action).
119. 522 F.2d 1265, 1269 (7th Cir. 1975); see supranotes 71-81 and accompanying text (discussion of Goldstandt v. Bear, Stearns & Co.). In Goldstandt, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the
plaintiffs could not invoke the modified equitable tolling doctrine to save their § 10(b) claim
from limitations preclusion. 522 F.2d at 1268-69. The Goldstandt court determined that the defendants' persistence in maintaining their § 10(b) misrepresentations did not constitute affirmative
concealment even though the plaintiffs, on several occasions, had questioned the defendants expressly on this issue. See id. at 1266, 1268. In denying the misrepresentations of the defendants
the status of affirmative concealment, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs' reliance
on the defendants' misrepresentations was unreasonable. See id. at 1269.
120. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text (discussion of operation of traditional
equitable tolling doctrine).
121. See supranote 48-52 and accompanying text (discussion of operation of modified equitable
tolling doctrine).
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each particular case warrant suspension of the section 10(b) limitations period
than the traditional doctrine provides. Although federal court adoption of
the modified equitable tolling doctrine may complicate section 10(b) limitations law,' 22 the flexibility that the modified doctrine provides federal judges
to influence section 10(b) limitations issues effectuates the remedial purposes
underlying section 10(b) better than the traditional equitable tolling doctrine."'
Section 10(b) of the '34 Act undertakes to promote high ethical standards
in securities transactions. 24 Concomitant with this goal, the implied private
right of action under section 10(b) operates to counteract securities fraud.2 5
Preclusion of a section 10(b) action through the medium of the statute of
limitations defense, however, contravenes the remedial purposes underlying
section 10(b).12 6 Accordingly, the federal judiciary has formulated the federal
equitable tolling doctrine to save section 10(b) actions from limitations
preclusion.'2 7 The federal equitable tolling doctrine operates by extending the
length of time during which a plaintiff's section 10(b) right of action will remain

'viable.' 2 ' Due to the inherent complexity of securities fraud actions 2 9 and the
fact that securities claims are highly susceptible to concealment, 30 extension
122. See supra notes 18 & I1I and accompanying text (discussion of disparity existing in
§ 10(b) limitations law and concomitant criticism of modified equitable tolling doctrine).
123. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. American Real Estate Inv. Trust, 529 F. Supp. 1300,
1306 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (under federal securities laws, federal courts have broad powers and wide
discretion to fashion appropriate remedy); Timmreck v. Munn, 433 F. Supp. 396, 399-400 (N.D.
Ill. 1977) (courts should employ federal securities laws with flexibility to remedy diverse forms
of investment fraud); cf., e.g., Madison Consultants v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 710 F.2d
57, 61 (2d Cir. 1983) (federal courts must interpret § 10(b) flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342, 354
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Duncan v. City of Oneida, 564 F.
Supp. 425, 434 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (same).
124. See Securities & Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963) (discussion of fundamental purpose underlying securities acts); Tomera v. Galt, 511
F.2d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); see also Long v. Abbott Mortgage Corp., 424 F. Supp.
1095, 1098-99 (D. Conn. 1976) (purposes of § 10(b) are to deter securities fraud, protect integrity
of securities market, and remedy securities violations).
125. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussion of federal judiciary's recognition
of implied private right of action under § 10(b).
126. See supra note 107 (policies underlying § 10(b) outweigh policies underlying statute
of limitations defense).
127. See, e.g., Diener v. Beckley Coal Corp., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fa . SEc. L.
RaP. (CCH) 99,663, p. 97,654-55 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1984) (court denied defendants' statute of
limitations motion to dismiss plaintiffs' § 10(b) claim because federal equitable tolling doctrine
extended viability of plaintiffs' claim); Rose v. Arkansas Valley Envti. & Util. Auth., 562 F.
Supp. 1180, 1196-97 (W.D. Mo. 1983) (same); In re N. Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513
F. Supp. 608, 631-32 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (same).
128. See supranote 40 (discussion of capacity of federal equitable tolling doctrine to extend
§ 10(b) limitations periods).
129. See United States v. Naftalin, 534 F.2d 770, 774 (8th Cir.) (securities laws are complex
and easily violated), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976); Piel v. National Semiconductor Corp.,
86 F.R.D. 357, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (nature of securities laws is complex and litigation thereunder
is expensive).
130. See Marcus, supra note 2, at 852.
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of the length of limitations periods applicable to section 10(b) accommodates
the character of section 10(b) as a catchall provision for securities fraud."'
Consequently, the federal judiciary should follow the lead of the Seventh Circuit and adopt the modified version of the federal equitable tolling doctrine
for implied private actions under section 10(b) of the '34 Act.
PETER G. ZEm Aq
131. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 103 S.Ct. 683, 687 (1983) (§ 10(b) is catchall
antifraud provision), Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (same). The first
federal court to imply a private right of action under § 10(b) noted the broad purpose of § 10(b)
to eliminate all manipulative or deceptive practices in securities transactions. See Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (§ 10 of '34 Act embodies broad purpose
to eliminate deception in securities transactions). But see Trecker v. Scag, 679 F.2d 703, 711
(7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., concurring) (Judge Posner stated that § 10(b) no longer operates
as catchall provision for securities deception but rather as mere jurisdictional ingress to federal
court system to litigate essentially state claims).

